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Lost Without Translation? Cross-Referencing
and a New Global Community of Courts
ANTJE WIENER* & PHILIP LISTE**t
ABSTRACT
Anne-Marie Slaughter has described the "new world order" as
characterized by some "conceptual shifts," including an increasing
cooperation of domestic courts across nation-state boundaries. The cross-
jurisdictional referencing of legal norms and decisions, as Slaughter
holds, would lead into a "global community of courts." This article takes
issue with that observation. We argue that for such a community to
emerge, cross-referencing would need to be followed by an effective
transmission of meaning from one (legal) context to another. Following
recent insights in the field of International Relations norm research,
however, we can expect such meanings to be contested-in particular,
when different cultural repertoires operate on either side of the
interactive processes. Therefore, a need for translation ensues (i.e., a
translation of constitutional norms or concepts from one legal order into
another). The conditions of a "global community of courts" are thus not
easily met. In this respect, the aim of the article is to put Slaughter's
thesis to an empirical test. To extrapolate the "normative structures of
meaning-in-use" the article builds on the analysis of semi-structured
interviews with legal practitioners who were involved in the
jurisprudence on anti-terrorism measures in two countries, Canada and
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Germany. During this empirical work, we found a "global community of
courts" not yet emerged. Although the concept of community does matter
as an explanatory reference for research on legal cross-referencing across
national borders, our research suggests that practice of cross-referencing
is still more "culturally" fragmented than unified, and normative
references are more regionally diverse than globally shared. Moreover,
the normative context within which referencing takes place remains
strong, so that the meaning of "foreign" concepts is often constructed by
means of contestation rather than transferred from one contest into
another.
INTRODUCTION
In their everyday practice, judges reference previous legal decisions
and, in so doing, reproduce what is sometimes called the "canon." But
what if the referencing practice of high courts transcends the confines of
national jurisdiction and legal referencing turns into "cross-
referencing," understood as referencing across the boundaries of nation-
states? This article takes issue with Anne-Marie Slaughter's
observation of courts taking part in a "new world order" characterized,
inter alia, by a "conceptual shift . . . from two systems-international
and domestic-to one."' As Slaughter holds,
the institutional identity of all these courts, and the
professional identity of the judges who sit on them, is
forged more by their common function of resolving
disputes under rules of law than by the differences in
the law they apply and the parties before them. It
stretches too far to describe them all as part of one
global legal system, but they certainly constitute a
global community of courts. 2
We argue that for such a community to emerge, cross-referencing
would need to be followed by effective cross-fertilization between
constitutional courts and judges (i.e., a transmission of meanings from
one (legal) context to another). Following critical norms research, we can
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,
192 (2003); see also Asher Alkoby, Theories of Compliance with International Law and the
Challenge of Cultural Difference, 4 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 151 (2008); Eyal Benvenisti,
Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (2008); Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in
Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL. 501 (2000).
2. Slaughter, supra note 1, at 192.
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expect such meanings to be contested, 3 in particular, when different
cultural repertoires operate on either side of the interactive processes.
Therefore, a need for translation ensues (i.e., a translation of
constitutional norms or concepts from one legal order into another). The
concept of translation-or the "problem of translation" 4-brings a
normative focus back in. When assuming that something has been
translated, we can easily ask whether the translation from one setting
into another was "successful," indicated by either a "good" or "bad"
translation. Neil Walker points to the "very idea of good translation"
and proposes some normative indicators. A "'thick' conception of what is
to be translated" would imply "a detailed hermeneutic understanding
both of the context in which it was originally embedded and of the new
context for which it is destined."5 Further, "those who can claim
membership of both linguistic communities must agree that the method
and product of the translation is adequate to capture and convey a
similar meaning in the two languages."6
Taken that any emergence of a community properly so called
involves at least a certain amount of "hermeneutic understanding" and
thus a 'thick' conception of what is to be translated," Walker's criteria
of translatability provide a welcome element for a normative framework
for scrutinizing the "global community of courts" thesis. Since we
understand a legal community to include normative foundations7 and
hermeneutic understanding,8 we argue that, without such "thick"
conception, a newly evolved communal setting cannot come into being.
In other words, the conditions of a "global community of courts," let
alone those of a systemic shift, are not easily met. In this respect, the
aim of the article is to put Slaughter's thesis to an empirical test.
Against the community thesis we propose a pluralist thesis as a counter
hypothesis, that is, different legal or constitutional communities of
referencing can be expected to co-exist despite the fact of ongoing cross-
3. See generally ANTJE WIENER, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION OF POLITICS: CONTESTED
NORMS AND INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTERS (2008).
4. Neil Walker, Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 27 (J. H. H. Weiler, Marlene Wind
eds., 2003); J. H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE
AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999).
5. Walker, supra note 4, at 36-37.
6. Id. at 37-38.
7. See generally Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International
Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT'L ORG. 55 (1997) (discussing
the nature of "fundamental institutions" and their role in international society); Friedrich
Kratochwil, International Law and International Sociology, 3 INT'L POL. Soc. 311 (2010)
(addressing the inherent difficulties of interdisciplinary endeavors).
8. Walker, supra note 4.
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referencing between courts and judges. The methodology follows a
bifocal approach that allows for a closer inspection of the interrelation
between the empirical observation of cross-referencing as a social
practice, on the one hand, and the normative underpinnings of
community formation as a social construct, on the other. To probe our
assumption that normative roots are indicative of a conceptual shift in
international law, we carried out comparative research on a small-scale
explorative basis. While agreeing with International Relations (IR)
theory that social practice matters for community formation,9 we hold
that the observation of increased cross-referencing-as such social
practice-is necessary, although insufficient, evidence for global
community formation. We contend that, to reveal the necessary
normative foundations of a legal community, the authority of its
fundamental norms needs to be demonstrated with reference to shared
meanings.' 0 To extrapolate the "normative structures of meaning-in-
use,"" we conducted semi-structured interviews with legal practitioners
who were involved in the jurisprudence on anti-terrorism measures in
two countries, Canada and Germany. During this empirical work, we
found a "global community of courts" not yet emerged. As our
explorative case study suggests, the pluralism thesis is better equipped
to capture the normative effects of cross-referencing.
The remainder of this article first critically recalls the main
assumptions of Slaughter's thesis by embedding it into a body of
theoretical work on community in the academic field of IR.12 Against
9. Emanuel Adler, Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in
International Relations, 26 MILLENNIUM 249 (1997); Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot,
International Practices, 3 INT'L THEORY 1 (2011); Barry Buzan, From International System
to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School,
47 INTL ORG. 327 (1993); Nicholas Onuf, The Constitution of International Society, 5 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1994); see generally ETIENNE WENGER, COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: LEANING,
MEANING, AND IDENTITY (1998). For the interrelation between normative or ethical
concerns with international practices, see, among others, MOLLY COCHRAN, NORMATIVE
THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (1999); Anthony F. Lang,
Global Constitutionalism as Middle Ground Ethics, in ETHICAL REASONING IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: ARGUMENTS FROM THE MIDDLE GROUND (Cornelia Navari ed.,
2013).
10. WIENER, supra note 3. See generally HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967) (exploring the ways in which ordinary people construct a
stable social world through everyday utterances and actions).
11. Jennifer Milliken, The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of
Research and Methods, 5 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 225 (1999); Jutta Weldes & Diana Saco,
Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of "The
Cuban Problem", 1960-1994, 25 MILLENNIUM 361 (1996); Antje Wiener, Enacting
Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations, 35 REV.
INT'L STUD. 175 (2009).
12. See infra Part I.
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this background, the article reformulates its major research question
and outlines the framework of empirical analysis.13 The main empirical
part of the article consists of a discussion and evaluation of the
interviews.14 It concludes with the research findings and an outlook for
further research.
I. TAKING THE GLOBAL "COMMUNITY" OF COURTS THESIS SERIOUSLY
Judicial cross-fertilization has been observed in the literature as the
result of constitutional judges' mutual referencing of foreign decisions
with persuasive appeal. Pointing to the phenomenon of "constitutional
cross-fertilization," Slaughter explains,
Constitutional courts are citing each other's precedents
on issues ranging from free speech to privacy rights to
the death penalty . . . unlike past legal borrowings
across borders, judges are now engaged not in passive
reception of foreign decisions, but in active and ongoing
dialogue. They cite each other not as precedent, but as
persuasive authority. They may also distinguish their
views from the views of other courts that have
considered similar problems. The result, at least in some
areas such as the death penalty and privacy rights, is an
emerging global jurisprudence.' 5
For the purposes of our study, however, we found it necessary to
sharpen the used terminology, particularly to prevent a merging of the
concepts with the result that causes and consequences can hardly be
distinguished. We define transjudicial dialogue as direct interactions
between involved legal practitioners including judges, lawyers, or
prosecutors. In turn, we conceptualize cross-fertilization as a more
complex phenomenon that is wider in scope but, at the same time, more
demanding because it already implies a certain change in domestic
jurisprudence. Since cross-fertilization literally points to a process of
legal systems mutually affecting one another, it is not considered a
practice in the strict sense of the term but rather an ongoing effect of
inter-judicial practice such as cross-referencing. Notably, cross-
fertilization implies a mutual process within which translation has a
role to play. The same does not necessarily apply to cross-referencing. In
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. Slaughter, supra note 1, at 193.
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sum, while cross-referencing is considered a legal practice, cross-
fertilization is understood as a consequence following from this practice.
With respect to the sharpening of the concept of community, we
draw on insight in the field of IR. Basically, the concept of community
plays an important role as a frame of reference with regard to the
validity of rules or norms in international order,' 6 thus accompanying
broader theoretical considerations on normativity in international
relations. This often implies the basic assumption of an international
liberal community of states, providing a yardstick for (mostly state)
behavior, for example, by pointing toward appropriateness with regard
to respecting fundamental norms such as democracy, human rights, or
the rule of law.17
In the work by Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, epistemic
communities are defined as consisting of professionals sharing, inter
alia, a "set of normative and principled beliefs," "shared notions of
validity," "intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighting and
validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise," and "a common
policy enterprise."18 Although mainly starting from an interest in the
transnational role of networks of scientists providing issue-specific
knowledge for international policy coordination-and not in global
jurisprudence-this early approach does indeed parallel Slaughter's
account on juridical networks. More recent work has, in fact,
concentrated on the process of the emergence of community through
social practice.19 In this respect, the incorporation of practice into IR has
contributed to a deeper analysis of how communal settings beyond the
nation-state may come into being through social construction, that is, by
means of a bottom-up process. At the same time, however, practice
research has so far failed to re-embed its analyses within a broad
concept of global normativity. 20
16. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN
WORLD POLITICS (2d ed.1995); Onuf, supra note 9.
17. See THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMs AND IDENTITY IN WORLD
POLITICS (Peter Katzenstein, ed., 1996). Studies in IR have also theorized how this
normativity is enforced through advocacy groups or other types of collective social actors,
see MARGARET E KECK & KATHRYN SIKINK, ACTIVITIEs BEYOND BORDERS (1998); Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52
INT'L ORG. 887; Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, in THE
PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn
Sikkink eds., 2013).
18. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
19. See generally Adler & Pouliot, supra note 9.
20. See, e.g., Antje Wiener & Antje Vetterlein, Gemeinschaft Revisited: Die sozialen
Grundlagen internationaler Ordnung [Community Revisited: The Social Foundations of
International Order], 41 LEVIATHAN 78, 78 (2013) (Ger.).
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Notably, Slaughter seems to take a position in between this body of
work in IR. On the one hand, her claim focuses on a bottom-up process
of emergence of a transnational communal structure. On the other
hand, it also extends to a broader understanding of normativity in the
global realm-that is, to a liberal community assumption including
fundamental norms such as democracy, human rights, or the rule of
law. It is for this reason that we are particularly interested in how this
transmission of normativity operates.
Again, the "problem of translation" can help to make sense of this
process. A 'thick' conception of what is to be translated," as Walker
holds, would imply "a detailed hermeneutic understanding both of the
context in which it was originally embedded and of the new context for
which it is destined."21 Further, "those who can claim membership of
both linguistic communities must agree that the method and product of
the translation is adequate to capture and convey a similar meaning in
the two languages."22
At first sight, the individual practice of "cultural validation,"23
which comes to the fore here, finds its parallel in Slaughter's work,
where she points to the category of awareness as an "awareness of
constitutional cross-fertilization on a global scale-an awareness of who
is citing whom among the judges themselves and a concomitant pride in
a cosmopolitan juridical outlook."24 Slaughter indeed identifies a
"psychological impact . .. leading constitutional judges to feel part of a
larger judicial community, an awareness strengthened by face-to-face
meetings."25 Slaughter, in other words, understands the emergence of
community as following from the judges' awareness of mutual ties
across jurisdictional boundaries. As the argument goes on, it is through
an ongoing networking practice that something happens to the
normative context within which the judges operate-a "network of
translation," as we would add.
Empirical research would therefore want to observe this kind of
"translational networking" at work and scrutinize the community thesis
by mapping cross-referencing and transjudicial dialogue as a cluster of
practices. Although this cluster is considered a necessary condition for
the constitution of a "new" sphere of normativity beyond the nation-
state, it is arguably not a sufficient condition for speaking of an evolved
community strictu sensu. To deliver that condition, the normative part
of the analysis substantiates the cross-fertilization claim by
21. Walker, supra note 4 at 27.
22. Id. at 37-38.
23. WIENER, supra note 3, at 183.
24. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 74-75 (2004).
25. Id. at 101, emphasis added by author.
269
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:1
demonstrating that translation really occurs and that, in so doing,
transjudicial practice affects the judicial normativity at play in the
domestic juridical contexts. If this can be achieved, the normative
structure of meaning-in-use, 26 which is enacted by the legal
practitioners' practice, would be expected to indicate a shift: The
structure would need to show shared normative perceptions-
hermeneutical understanding-of constitutional court judges and
lawyers with different national (or, more generally speaking, cultural)
root contexts. In a "Deutschian" sense, transnational arenas that are
constituted through -interactive social practice would thus indicate
harmonization. 27 Once transnational normative structures of meaning-
in-use are identified, the case for supporting the community thesis gains
clout.
II. RESEARCH QUESTION AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
As a minimal condition for a community of courts, we would expect
an international group of legal practitioners to be involved in a range of
interactions. While engaging in issues that usually evolve domestically,
practitioners would further be expected to take into account
international norms and/or judgments made by courts from other
jurisdictions. While they are expected to ascribe meaning to
international or foreign legal norms as well as to elements of their legal
culture, the ongoing meaning-generating process of translational
jurisprudence holds the key to our understanding of how normative
structures are affected. It was argued that normative structure depends
on social practice. More specifically, given the contingent quality of
meaning-in-use, the structure depends on iterated individual
interaction. 28 These enactive practices include, for example, translating
other normative meanings into one's own normative structure to the
effect that domestic structures of meaning are challenged and may-
over the ensuing course of contestation-become subject to change. As a
result, new transnational structures of meaning would emerge and a
contingent process enacting normative meaning-in-use would affect
spaces of relevant judicial practice.
The leading empirical research question of this article highlights the
way in which individuals relate to norms (principles, values, and
26. Milliken, supra note 11, at 231; Weldes & Saco, supra note 11.
27. WIENER, supra note 3; see generally Karl W. Deutsch, The Growth of Nations: Some
Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration, 5 WORLD POLITICS 168 (1953); Adler
& Pouliot, supra note 9; Adler, supra note 9; NICHOLAS ONUF, WORLD OF OUR MAKING:
RULES AND RULE IN SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989).
28. WIENER, supra note 3, at 184-93.
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regulations) of international and/or foreign law. Do individual inter-
national enactments of normative structures of meaning-in-use sustain
the national (or domestically rooted) structure, or do they (also) reveal
the emergence of a shared transnational normative sphere that could be
considered the root of a global community?
A. Case Selection
In a first step, the empirical research focused on comparing
constitutional court jurisprudence in relation with anti-terrorism
measures in two countries, Canada and Germany. Given the global
spreading of a discourse on terrorist threats since 9/11,29 a high degree
of interrelatedness among national judicial systems can be expected in
this issue area. The focus on counter-terrorism measures and their
impact on fundamental rights issues were thus chosen as a "most likely"
case scenario, suggesting that given the global reach of the discourse on
terrorism and the related executive, legislative, and juridical practices,30
reliance on experiences in other legal systems and international legal
rules stands to be expected. This includes references to common
fundamental norms in international relations, such as the norm of
abstention from torture.3 1 In other words, the prime interest of the
project is not an elaboration of domestic or international juridical
attempts to counter terrorism as such. Rather, our rationale is to
scrutinize the "global community of courts" thesis with regard to an
issue area where an effective cross-fertilization is most likely.
With respect to our case selection, Canada and Germany were
chosen as legal systems with a remarkable willingness to look. beyond
their jurisdictional borders.32 While in the literature, Germany falls
under the "doing it open" category, 33 Canada is taken as a "wide-ranging
use of foreign law" example. 34 In addition, we hold that a "global"
community of courts should also bridge different legal cultures or "legal
29. See Geoffrey Edwards & Christoph 0. Meyer, Introduction: Charting a Contested
Transformation, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1, 4 (2008).
30. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11
September, 16 INT'L REL. 155 (2002).
31. See generally, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.NT.S. 85 (discussing the agreements
between nations to not torture prisoners).
32. See generally Basil Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 11, 30-48 (2005) (giving examples and explanations of the use of foreign legal
decisions in German and Canadian courts).
33. Id. at 34.
34. Id. at 45.
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families."35 In this respect, our study includes practice of "Germanic"
and "Anglo-American" legal systems.36 Furthermore, the decision to
focus on constitutional courts in Canada and Germany, respectively,
follows from the relatively high international visibility of the two courts
beyond the borders of their respective national communities.37
As would be expected given the context of global security threats,
courts in both countries had to deal with government responses to
terrorist threats. In Germany, cases were brought before the Federal
Constitutional Court as constitutional complaints against decisions
made by Higher Regional Courts. Initially, action had been taken
against the complainants because of putative terrorist activities abroad
following foreign authorities' requests of extradition (by Turkey, Spain,
and the United States).38 Since these foreign extradition requests were
judged in the affirmative and confirmed by the Higher Regional Courts,
the defendants complained before the Constitutional Court, arguing,
inter alia, that it had not been sufficiently considered that they would
be at risk of being tortured when brought to the corresponding foreign
countries. 39 While two of the complaints (the cases where extraditions to
Turkey and Spain were contested) were rejected by the Federal Court
for procedural reasons, the third one (the case of requested extradition
to the United States) was reviewed substantively but was then rejected
as well.40
A Canadian Supreme Court (SCC) decision that is often cited in
support of the argument that the practice of judicial cross-referencing
marks the emergence of a "global community of courts" is Suresh v.
Canada.41 In this case, the SCC addressed the constitutionality of
deportation to face torture. While acknowledging international and
foreign legal authorities suggesting that the norm against torture is an
absolute one, the SCC concluded in Suresh that deportation to face
35. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 63-65 (Tony
Weir trans., Oxford University Press 3d rev. ed. 1998).
36. Id.
37. See generally Brun-Otto Bryde, The Constitutional Judge and the International
Constitutionalist Dialogue, 80 TUL. L. REV. 203 (2005) (rationalizing that those courts
which are perceived even beyond their jurisdictional boundaries are most likely to be
referenced by their counterparts in other countries).
38. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 15, 2007,
docket number 2 BvR 1680/07 (Ger.), available at JURIs; Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 24, 2003, docket number 2 BvR 1521/03
(Ger), available at JURIS; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Nov. 5, 2003, docket number 2 BvR 1506/03 (Ger), available at JURIs.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); see also Ahani v. Canada, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 72 (Can.) (finding that Ahani's risk of torture upon return to Iran was minimal).
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torture was "generally unconstitutional,"42 leaving open the possibility
that deportation to torture could be justified under the Canadian
Constitution in "exceptional circumstances." 43 In considering the
international legal authorities suggesting otherwise, the Court famously
stated,
International norms are not, strictly speaking, binding
in Canada unless they have been incorporated into
Canadian law by enactment.. . . Our concern is not with
Canada's obligations qua obligations [but] with the
principles of fundamental justice. We look to
international law as evidence of these principles and not
as controlling in itself.4 4
The approach taken in Suresh has since been followed by the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in several cases, notwithstanding the
fact that the relevant revised act, renamed the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, now contains a provision expressly directing that
the "Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that . . . complies
with international human rights instruments to which Canada is
signatory."45 In Charkaoui (Re) the Supreme Court declined to revisit
the issue and stated that deportation to torture remained a possibility
under Canadian law, thereby implicitly endorsing the Federal Court of
Appeal's holding. 46
In cases brought before Canadian courts after the Suresh decision,
the "exceptional circumstances" exception has not been applied, and
decisions by the government to deport noncitizens when risk of torture
existed were not upheld by courts. However, the very existence of the
possibility of deportation has had far reaching implications on the
liberty of the individuals concerned. By leaving open the possibility of
derogation from an established international norm, Canadian courts
created a general as opposed to absolute prohibition on torture, with the
effect that the meaning of this norm in Canada is fundamentally
different than in other jurisdictions. 4 7
42. Suresh, [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 1 1.
43. Id. at 78.
44. Id. at T 60.
45. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., c. 27, 4 (Can.).
46. Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, TT 15, 99 (Can.); see also
Rayner Thwaites, Discriminating Against Non-Citizens under the Charter: Charkaoui and
Section 15, 34 QUEEN'S L. J. 669, 707 (2009).
47. Asher Alkoby, International and Foreign Law in Judicial Reviews of Anti-
Terrorism Measures, unpublished working paper prepared for the TransCoop Workshop,
University of Hamburg, Dec 16-17, 2010 (on file with the authors); Rayner Thwaites, A
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B. Interview Selection
To establish how far practice, in fact, triggers a new global
community, analyses that rely exclusively on court rulings and the
scope and frequency of individual networking are less indicative than
work that focuses on reconstructing the normative structures of
meaning-in-use to establish whether they have changed through cross-
referencing. Therefore, we conducted semi-structured interviews with
some "key players," including judges, prosecutors, and lawyers.48 This
selection was based on the assumption that these legal practitioners
were most likely to enact normativity in the course of their daily legal
practice. This allowed us to closely examine the normative structure of
meaning-in-use in their respective practices to gain insight into the
research question: Is the normative context of judicial practice affected
by cross-referencing, and, if so, does a jurisprudential community arise?
Although relying mainly on interviews with legal practitioners, our
approach does not take at face value what these practitioners tell us in
such a way as a formal analysis of court rulings would. What we were
mostly interested in is not facts but rather the normative underpinnings
at work during the interviews and, so we assume, also in the
practitioners' daily practice. We thus build our analysis on the
methodological assumption that interpreting text generated through
interviews leads to the normative underpinnings "behind" or
"underneath" the interviewees' (legal) argumentations. 49 Against this
background, we conducted the interviews along the following three
clusters of indicators, which were selected with a view to establish
standards of necessary elements of community (formation): (1)
international law as a shared meta-framework; (2) shared
interpretation of the norms of fundamental and human rights; and (3)
shared interpretation of the global norm of abstention from torture.
While the first indicator relates to more general patterns of recognition
regarding the normative "outside" (legal practice beyond the national
jurisdictional boundaries), the latter two have been selected to generate
more specific and presumably varying interpretations of linking
international and domestic law and, thus, revealing shades of
Coordinated Judicial Response to Counter-Terrorism?: Counter-Examples, in IAPPING
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS: THE EU, CANADA AND WAR ON TERROR 236 (Mark
B. Salter ed., 2010).
48. For the research project we have conducted semi-structured interviews with 14
individuals who are or have been involved in transjudicial dialogue as judges, lawyers or
prosecutors (anonymized). The interview transcripts are on file with the research project.
49. Wiener, supra note 11; Friedrich Kratochwil, Book Review, 11 INT'L J. CON. L. 542
(2013).
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distinctive or overlapping normativity in the international or domestic
realms, respectively.
. Although all interviewees seemed to be well aware of the fact that
their working practice involved the potential of -transcending
jurisdictional boundaries, the text corpus generated by all interviews
nonetheless revealed a predominant skepticism. But what exactly is the
meaning of these boundaries to individuals who are referring to legal
norms through jurisprudence in their daily working practice and who
are therewith involved in enacting and (re)constituting normative
structures of meaning-in-use? To this end, the interviewees were asked
about their respective involvement and experience with referring to
documents or sources that do not originate from their "own"
jurisdictions. In particular, we were interested in how the interrelation
between domestic and international normativity played out with regard
to the meaning ascribed to the domestic and the international arenas,
respectively, taking into account the interviewees' daily legal practice.
C. Hypotheses
It follows that for the community thesis to hold we should be able to
find convergence or, at the very least, a certain overlap of patterns of
recognition with the following interviewees' perceptions: first, no
absolute boundaries are drawn between domestic and international
normative spheres; second, the way individual fundamental and human
rights are handled in domestic normative frameworks converges across
domestic arenas (of national jurisdictional spaces); and third, the way
the norm of abstention from torture (particularly with respect to the
international norm against torture) is handled converges as well.
In turn, we propose a pluralist thesis as a counter hypothesis. That
is, different legal or constitutional communities of referencing coexist.
For the case at hand, that means that while cross-referencing or
transjudicial dialogue occurs on a regular basis, domestic arenas
continue to exist as well, thus creating a plurality of arenas-without a
remarkable amount of cross-fertilization. According to the pluralist
thesis, we expect to find nationally distinct context-specific
understandings though generated through cross-referencing beyond
national jurisdictional boundaries. First, distinct boundaries between
domestic and international normative frameworks or norms of
international and/or international foreign law would be enacted with
reference to specific normative structure of meaning-in-use related to
the specific nation-state context. Second, interpretations of how to
implement individual rights (including a corresponding consideration of
international human rights norms) in the domestic normative
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framework and, third, how to rely on the norm of abstention from
torture (particularly with respect to the international norm against
torture) would diverge across nation-state jurisdictional spaces.
III. CASE STUDY EVALUATION
A. Domestic v. International Normativity? "Community" Views
When asked about the international relevance of domestic courts,
interviewees in both countries articulated skepticism: "The
international role of courts, including constitutional courts, is not as
important as one could think;"50 "I gave no thought on the community
view;"51 "I could participate in being a citizen of the world but at the end
of the day I'm a citizen of this country."52 However, upon closer
inspection, difference with regard to how interviewees related to "the
international" was revealed. The German sample shows the emerging
perception of an integrated sphere of normativity beyond the domestic
jurisdictional arena. The Canadians, though well aware of international
repercussions of their work, did not articulate these kinds of
internationalist sensibilities or fidelity.53 While for the project's research
question, the rationale for this difference matters less than the finding
that different interpretations do exist, it is likely that the advanced
state of European integration has affected legal practice in Germany.
This is supported by reliance on European law and/or legal decisions by
European courts, which interviewees considered an important aspect of
German legal practice. In this respect, the practice at the German
Constitutional Court would operate on an explicitly common "value
basis, these are the other member states of the Council of Europe, these
are the other member states of the European Union."54 And one German
chief prosecutor stated that he would not perceive the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as "foreign texts" from
his "inner" perspective, adding that within the European Union, one
50. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee German A (Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Ger.
A].
51. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian A (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter CA
A].
52. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian D (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter CA
D].
53. MARRTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 2 (2002); JUTTA BRUNNE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY
AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 30 (2010).
54. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee German B (Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Ger. B].
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would build upon a "relatively homogeneous body of values.'55 And he
added: "[Aind you notice that despite the different legal systems our
expectations and imaginations are coined in rather similar ways."56
Europe is thus perceived as having a relatively similar legal culture
with a solid foundation of basic positions or principles that tend to be
shared across the inner-European jurisdictional boundaries.
In turn, the Canadian interviewees demonstrated similar interfaces
in legal culture by pointing to "friends from a legal point of view, so,
U.K., Australia, New Zealand, U.S. as well."57 That is, they referred to
countries with which they share the legal tradition of common law-as
well as the historical experience of the Commonwealth of Nations (the
Commonwealth). In addition, these countries are perceived as the
normative environment in which their own legal practice is likely to be
acknowledged and recognized.
This finding confirms the literature that suggests that the
recognition of legal practice beyond the boundaries of one's own legal
system is rather selective and depends on shared experience.5 8 Whereas
the German interviewees support the perception of the European legal
culture as remarkably similar, the Canadian interviewees show the
reliance on the traditional bonds of the Commonwealth legal culture.59
To take up Slaughter's distinction between vertical and horizontal
networks, the German interviewees' construction of a European legal
sphere reveals a tendency to rely on a vertical relation with an emphasis
on European law and decisions by European courts. By contrast, the
Canadian interviewees pointed to horizontal relations between legal
practice in Canada and other Commonwealth countries. In each of the
two normative contexts, translation between jurisdictional spheres
seems to be taken as rather unproblematic.
Regarding this distinctive type of cross-referencing, it is notable
that despite their respective openness toward "the international," both
55. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee German E (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Ger. E].
56. Id.
57. CA D, supra note 52.
58. See JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF
DIVERSITY 140 (1995); Adler & Pouliot, supra note 9, at 111; see generally WIENER, supra
note 3.
59. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, MONICA SECCOMBE & JOSEPH WEILER, INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAw: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (1986); Ulrich Haltern,
Integration Through Law, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY 177 (Antje Wiener &
Thomas Diez eds., 2004); see also, the Opinion of the Advocate General in the Kadi case,
C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Comm'n, Jan. 16, 2008, and C-415/05, Al Barakaat v.
Council and Comm'n, Jan. 23, 2008 (determining the invalidity of certain UN Security
Council regulations regarding suspected terrorists).
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groups of interviewees emphasized their respective national
jurisdictional context. The interviews reveal a strong persistence of the
respective domestic constitutional arena as their major normative frame
of reference. As one Canadian judge stated, "We have a very strong
constitutional accord of our own."60 Similarly, Germans were eager to
point to their constitutional tradition, for example, by rejecting the
importance of international law and instead relying on the "objective
principle of the rule of law,"61 as a concept that was first established by
the Constitutional Court in the early Luth judgment,62 or by holding
that "every country has developed their own style of jurisprudence."63 In
one interview, a Judge referred to the importance of an "overall view of
all fundamental rights and their inherent institutional components" and
mentioned the role of the Liith case with regard to the "argument with
the objective legal order."64
That is, with regard to the question of international law most
broadly conceived, the interviews demonstrate that the importance of
international, norms is clearly subordinated to the specific context of
interpretation in the domestic arena. One Canadian lawyer expressed
this understanding quite well by noting that
even to the extent that we argue the [sic] refugee
convention, the torture convention or the convention on
the rights of a child in domestic courts, we are arguing
that the principle in the convention but we are basing
most of our arguments on Canadian interpretation of
Canada's obligations under those conventions.65
The same view is expressed even more strongly by the German
interviewees, for example, by the following interviewee who thought
that reliance on international law was simply not needed because the
German Basic Law would be sufficient in most cases: "[T]hat means if
we always comply with the Basic Law, we do actually also comply with
almost all human rights treaties; in this respect, we don't need an
60. CA A, supra note 51.
61. German original term: objektives Rechtsstaatsprinzip; Ger. A, supra note 50.
62. Interestingly, even in this early judgment the court practiced cross-referencing. See
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, docket
number 1 BvR 400/51 (Ger.), available at JURIS.
63. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee German C (Apr. 08, 2011) [hereinafter Ger.
C].
64. Ger. A, supra note 50.
65. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian F (Aug. 27, 2011) [hereinafter
CA F].
278
LOST WITHOUT TRANSLATION?
additional motivation from human rights treaties."66 And a former judge
at the German Constitutional Court put it in an even more explicit way,
noting that of course one would know the international norms "and one
interprets everything. But I am that rigorous, for being solidly grounded
in our constitution."67
It follows that experience with one's own legal system and tradition
or legal culture was obviously felt as being of crucial importance. In the
case of some interviewees, this kind of context sensibility even went so
far as to promote a certain kind of skepticism toward transjudicial
dialogue and the globalization of jurisprudence more generally:
But a comparable federal construction like Germany, I
don't know any country. And therefore you cannot make
sense of legal comparison. And with respect to
fundamental rights, the very same problem comes into
play that I have mentioned earlier, that is, what is
behind every legal order and every legal culture: the
history . . . . And therefore it is very difficult, from my
point of view, to rely on decisions from other countries in
a legal comparison kind of way.68
It is important to mention at this point that, arguably, the
experience with the domestic legal context relates to individual
experience. And, therefore language problems-that is, linguistic
translation-are often mentioned as a considerable hurdle toward
effective transjudicial dialogue. However, the younger generation of
lawyers, who are frequently educated abroad and, therefore, are well
trained in international approaches to law, is expected to make a
difference. This would sustain the expectation that, in the future,
increased language competencies and professional experience abroad
are likely to further transjudicial dialogue. If this were the case, it
would enhance the probability for global community formation.
As the interviews reveal, cross-referencing and transjudicial
dialogue is often considered with respect to consequences abroad, while
the interviewees' respective domestic legal arena was-by implication-
understood as a kind of blueprint for the development of other, less
developed systems. Dialogue across national jurisdictions is also seen as
effective with regard to an evolving awareness of "outside sources." As
this Canadian interviewee stated for example,
66. Ger. C, supra note 63.
67. Ger. A, supra note 50.
68. Id.
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[W]hether they [the judges] cite them or not, they are
aware of them. They really are. First of all, they [the
"outside sources"] are pleaded before them. And secondly
they go to these . . . Commonwealth conferences . . .
every few years. They go to those kinds of things. And
there are more and more sort of judicial interactions
with other judges in other parts of the world in different
forms more so than there ever was before. So, no, I think
they are perfectly aware of them.69
Notably, this reply suggests "awareness" about the availability of
foreign sources, rather than reference to an evolving transjudicial
normative structure of meaning-in-use. With regard to the question
about an evolving community, knowing that there is something "out
there" must be considered as analytically distinct from the finding of an
intersubjectively shared understanding about the meaning of these
"outside" sources.70
An intriguing example of an established pattern of cross-
referencing, and eventually cross-fertilization, came to the fore in one of
the Canadian interviews when one practitioner referred to the "special
advocate" model in the United Kingdom used to mediate the tension
between confidentiality and disclosure when examining the case against
suspected terrorists.71 When asked for cross-fertilization in the area of
national security, this Canadian interviewee mentioned the mutual
reliance of the Canadian and British legal systems as follows:
The irony was they [the British] referred to the special
advocates as the Canadian system when in fact it was
not the Canadian system. In Canada, the process that
we had in place was different. It was . . . a hearing held
in front of the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
It was a full hearing ... you had the full right to counsel
and the Security Intelligence Review Committee had
their own counsel who . . . was there to protect the
interests of the person in the secret hearing. But he had
much more ability to communicate than the special
advocate model that was adopted. But the Europeans ...
69. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian E (Aug. 24, 2011) [hereinafter
CA El.
70. SLAUGHTER, supra note 24.
71. Audrey Macklin, TransJudicial Conversations about Security and Human Rights, in
MAPPING TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS: THE EU, CANADA AND WAR ON TERROR
212 (Mark B. Salter ed., 2010).
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the English thought they were bringing in the Canadian
system. They created their own system which was sort of
a bastardized version of the Security Intelligence Review
Committee's system where you had security clearance
lawyers who could meet with the person . . . . So there
were these two different models. The English said they
were adopting the Canadian system when they were
doing something different which was the special
advocate system.72
While from the perspective of the United Kingdom, as well as in the
ECtHR Chahal decision, this procedure was perceived as originating
from the Canadian legal system's Security Intelligence Review
Committee (SIRC), Canadian courts viewed it as originating in the
United Kingdom.73 Curiously, the special advocate model was
considered as "foreign" from both sides of the pond. The fact that ideas
are traveling from one domestic legal system to another does not
necessarily indicate an adoption of shared legal reference. Instead, the
very idea changed while "traveling." From the point of view of the
interviewee, this change of meaning had affected a core aspect of the
procedure at hand, namely, the protection of "the interests of the person
in the secret hearing."74 When asked whether this sustained an
exchange of ideas between two national jurisdictions, the same
interviewee replied, "[W]e rely on their decisions, they rely on our
decisions. We use the positive aspects of what is happening in England
to our advantage and they use the positive aspects of what is happening
in Canada in their submissions."75
This suggests that while cross-fertilization can be identified as a
result of cross-referencing, it does not necessarily mean the transfer of
one idea into another context as a mere diffusion of ideas in the sense
that the meaning of a concept is left untouched when applied in another
context. It does not happen in a linear manner. While both legal
systems, Canada and the United Kingdom, relied on each other's
procedures involving safeguards of constitutional rights, the outcome
was obviously not a mutual understanding of norms, and the rights-
72. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian G (Aug. 18, 2011) [hereinafter
CA G] (emphasis added).
73. See Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 1 69 (Can.).
74. See id.
75. CA G, supra note 72.
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infringing practices continued to diverge.76 Here, translation has
obviously failed. "It is a complicated history," another interviewee held.
The U.K. will tell you that they got their special
advocates from the SIRC model. We would turn around
that the SIRC model is fundamentally different from
what ended up as the special advocates regime model in
the UK because the SIRC model is based on the fact that
the counsel is there to assist SIRC and special advocate
is there to assist the person concerned. So you have got a
fundamental change of the focus of the representation or
the focus of the advocacy. But what you have is you have
had this circle effect. And I think that that will always
continue to happen.77
As the last sentence of this interview excerpt indicates, this
interviewee expects concepts traveling across borders to change
meaning and takes it for granted that things like this "will always
continue to happen." It follows from this view that cross-referencing
may indeed have the effect of cross-fertilization, yet, without generating
mutual understanding. But the insight that dialogue across
jurisdictions is effective remains analytically distinct from the finding
that the practice of inter-national cross-referencing to norms or
procedures generates shared understandings. In effect, the case of the
SIRC-Special Advocate model ' is a very good example of failed
translation in the sense of a misunderstanding, though a productive one
as evaluated in the corresponding domestic contexts.78 The
implementation of a concept within a new legal context did obviously
take place without accounting for the context the concept was taken
from. Interestingly, this mode of failed translations operated mutually,
that is in both directions. Here, cross-referencing worked without an
emergence of shared normative understanding.
Regarding our theoretical assumptions, we would expect this
obviously lacking dimension of understanding to be furthered especially
through interpersonal encounters (i.e., those forms of transjudicial
dialogue that Slaughter also refers to). But here, again, the interviews
76. Macklin, supra note 71, at 227 ("And that is what Canada has today: a special
advocate scheme that mimics a deficient UK model that is itself a copy of a non-existent
Canadian precedent.").
77. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian H (Jul. 08, 2011) [hereinafter CA
H] (emphasis added).
78. See generally Giinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative
Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 411 (1985) (for the concept of "productive misunderstanding").
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reveal a considerable amount of skepticism, either with respect to
lacking intensity or effectiveness of dialogue. At first sight, Canadian
and German interviewees did not differ remarkably in this regard. For
example, pointing to a corresponding distinction between referencing
and dialogue, one Canadian lawyer said in an interview:
I would see more of a web of decisions than a web of
people . . . like lawyers. I mean I'm conscious of decision
making in other countries. And in a number of countries
I know the lawyers who argued the cases. But I know
them sporadically . . . I don't know them through any
concerted effort to keep in touch.79
In effect, it is this kind of face-to-face interaction that can be
assumed to be most effective with regard to the emergence of communal
bonds. Trust seems to be an important aspect, and dialogue and
cooperation are indeed seen as important for the emergence of trust, in
particular because jurists would tend to be shaped by their respective
domestic legal order. As this interviewee notes,
[T]he whole thing [cooperation across jurisdictional
boundaries] indeed has an end in generating mutual
trust. In the international context, this is not really that
easy, one has to say [laughing]. Because the grounding
in the own legal order very much forms the jurist, that
is, the German jurist. There is indeed a certain hubris
that the own legal order is fine while the other countries
will have to be observed with a certain scepticism. And
for this reason, cooperation is indeed important when
one really sees that people elsewhere are concerned with
similar problem as we are.80
Although this suggests that personal interactions are helpful, this is
not the same as saying that they are also effective. With respect to
effectiveness, interviewees demonstrate skepticism especially at the
point when describing the concrete practice of dialogue. One German
constitutional judge, himself well aware of Slaughter's work, pointed
out:
79. CA E, supra note 69.
80. Ger. E, supra note 55.
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Everybody, I would say, has participated in this
informal exchange that Slaughter refers to. That has
even been rather troublesome, every two weeks another
foreign court comes to Karlsruhe or we are going
somewhere . . . and, in addition, there are private
conferences where constitutional judges from different
countries are invited. One indeed meets rather
frequently . . . . Thus, what Slaughter means does exist,
although it might be a bit exaggerated that there is
something like a brotherhood of judges. More often than
not, it is more protocol or courtesy visits with no real
value added in scholarly terms . . . . There is not much
happening.8
The same interviewee conceded that the format of the judicial
encounters could affect the extent of the mutual learning process. While
large conferences like the meeting of European constitutional courts
would be "rather worthless events,"82 there would be meetings like the
Global Constitutionalism Seminar at Yale University83 or meetings of
only two constitutional courts. The latter type could be effective if no
language difficulties exist. "Then, it comes to good cross-fertilization,
one can really learn something."84
Concluding from the individual perspectives of these interviewees, it
is suggested that the crucial effect of transjudicial dialogue consists of
learning from abroad. This finding is compatible with the literature on
epistemic communities.85 If we take the analytical distinction between
81. Ger. C, supra note 63.
82. Id.
83. GRUBER PROGRAM FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS AT YALE LAW
SCHOOL, GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM SEMINAR, http://www.law.yale.edulintellectuallife/
globalconstitutionalismseminar.htm (last visited Sep. 17, 2012).
84. Ger. C, supra note 63 (The whole passage reads: "Conferences, like meetings of the
European Constitutional Courts. And these are rather worthless events, while there is,
every year, a meeting, Global Constitutionalism Seminar. I have always attended during
the last six years. These are meeting of professors from the Yale faculty who invite judges
from high constitutional courts and high courts; and there is real talk going on for three
days; that is really important; there is really something going on. And something similar
exists. And also meetings of two constitutional courts, in particular when one has no
language difficulties that one has very often of course when there is no interpreter. Then,
there is not so much going on. But if one has a shared language, say, when we meet the
Austrian Constitutional Court or an Anglo-Saxon like the Canadian Supreme Court, and
so on. Then, it comes to good cross-fertilization, one can really learn something.").
85. Haas, supra notel8, at 30; see generally Adler, supra note 9; Emanuel Adler,
Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and
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two types of social learning (i.e., one that focuses on behavioral change
such as perception and recognition); another that focuses on cognitive
change such as normative evaluation and validation-into account,
however, it follows that epistemic communities that evolve through
social learning based on "on and off' meetings at common conferences
are a necessary, yet not a sufficient, indicator for shared normative
understandings.8 6 Such shared understandings depend on iterated
individual interaction over time. That is, learning from foreign
jurisdictions can occur without buying into their particular normativity.
Translation occurs for a particular purpose, which is not the
understanding of the normative context a norm or concept is taken
from. This is also sustained by an assertion by this Canadian
interviewee who says, "[W]hat is a driving force in UK may not even
exist in Canada so you can learn from them but you learn with
caution."8 7 This instrumental usage of references to legal practice
beyond one's own legal system demonstrates the latter, cognitive type of
social learning. Canadian interviewees, in particular, expressed this
type of learning. For example, a government counsel held that foreign
cases were particularly discussed when raised by the applicant side.88 In
this respect, cross-referencing was revealed to be not an end in itself. In
the same vein, another Canadian lawyer said that
[w]e rely on them to the extent that they help our
position. So when the international norms have moved
further than the norms in our country we will rely on
the international norms to try and bring Canada in line
with the rest of the world. At the same time the
government relies on international norm sometimes
because they have to make modifications to the
legislation to make Charter requirements. So they turn
to international norms too.89
Their Progress, in PROGRESS IN POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43, 56 (Emanuel
Adler & Beverly Crawford, eds., 1991).
86. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 5 (1989); see also Antje Wiener, Contested compliance:
Interventions on the normative structure of world politics, 10 EUR. J. INT'L. REL. 189, 201
(2004); see also Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National
Security, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 17, at 26.
87. CA H, supra note 77.
88. Id.
89. CA G, supra note 72.
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And, regarding the development of Canadian law, another Canadian
interviewee made a similar argument, yet, making a negative point:
[I]t is clear that there is something that has been
developed in Canadian law that does not support the
argument of the party that they will go outside. They've
been using U.K. jurisprudence or Australian
jurisprudence for that purpose . . . It supports their
argument and puts some weight into it.90
The cross-fertilization of the British and Canadian legal systems
with regard to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (Canada)
and Special Advocate (United Kingdom) procedures can be understood
correspondingly: reliance on beyond-the-border concepts for instrumental
reasons instead of an integration of normative spheres.
Though with less frequency (and perhaps concreteness), similar
assertions of instrumentalism were also made by the German sample.
As one German constitutional judge mentioned, cross-referencing
"might be helpful, that can probably be said."9' At the same time, he
was rather ambivalent as to the question whether cross-referencing was
also crucial. He did, however, point out that it served
the legitimization [of a court decision]. When something
is very unpopular, let's say the Muslim halal slaughter
[Schtchten92], where both, animal rights protagonists
and Muslims go to the barricades. And then, one can
cite; yes, the Austrian Constitutional Court has made
the very same decision and also the ECtHR. Then, it is
helpful . . . also in order to make clear: Here, we have a
decision that we take up.93
Against this background, it is important to note an additional
differentiation that was revealed following the interviewers' query
"effective with regard to what?" Given the distinctive types of social
learning, dialogue can be effective with regard to learning though not
effective with regard to the emergence of a community. By the same
token, cross-referencing can be effective as a means to a particular end.
90. CA A, supra note 51.
91. Ger. C, supra note 63.
92. See Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15,
2002, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (BVERFGE) [DECISIONS OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] 104, 337 (Ger.).
93. Ger. C, supra note 63.
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However, as long as ends are primarily defined in a national context,
cross-referencing or transjudicial dialogue alone cannot be expected to
generate the normative integration of legal systems or the merging of
intersubjective "horizons," as it were.
In her work, Slaughter differentiates binding precedent from
persuasive authority, arguing that, in the context of cross-referencing,
"the question of drawing on and actually citing foreign cases becomes
one of the legitimacy of 'persuasive authority."'94 Slaughter cites
prominent U.S. judges who argue that even though foreign cases are
"rarely binding . . . conclusions reached by other countries and by the
international community should at times constitute persuasive
authority in American courts."95 Our interviews revealed a remarkable
variance when it came to the evaluation of the normative validity of
norms and decisions from "outside." This was.especially revealed by the
German sample, with the social fact of the current state of European
integration playing a decisive role. For example, one German judge was
quite clear about this distinction when explaining:
[W]hat I have just pointed out is legal comparison which
is never binding. By contrast, we are bound to
international law; we are bound to European law....
That [legal comparison] is a totally different mode of
application compared to the situation when we are
bound to an international treaty. Then, we have to apply
it. It does not override German law but we will try not to
get into conflict with it.96
What is interesting about this assertion is that, notwithstanding
prevailing questions about the formal or constitutional modes of
incorporating international law into the domestic legal realm, the
judge's feeling of obligation toward the normative content of
international legal norms does matter. It is thus the construction of
normativity through daily practice that sets the ground for an
international law-related argument to be "persuasive." How such
normativity is constructed becomes tangible in assertions pointing to
the concrete function of international law in the domestic legal process.
A corresponding aspect brought up by some of the Canadian
interviewees is the function that international norms may have for the
interpretation of domestic law, such as the Canadian Charter of Rights
94. SLAUGHTER, supra note 24, at 75.
95. Id. (quoting Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor).
96. Ger. C, supra note 63.
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and Freedoms. For example, while talking about the status of ratified
and not yet ratified international law, a Canadian judge asserted that
"if it has been ratified by our country, the treaty, I would feel a lot more
at ease using it. If our country has not ratified it . . . I would be less
responsive."97 And on the same point another judge pointed out:
Well I think as an interpretive guide but I don't know
where we could use it as a statement of domestic law...
. If we are inconsistent with domestic law then we have
to pull back and can inform our interpretation but we
can't adopt a principle which is inconsistent with
domestic law. . . . I think international law informs our
interpretation of domestic law but it is not
determinative unless it has been implemented in
Canadian domestic law.98
While the mere distinction between ratified and nonratified
international law is hardly surprising, as it is a consequent application
of the Canadian dualist doctrine,99 the ascription of international legal
norms' status is coupled with a rather formalistic argument on
normative implementation. The finding of a sensibility for international
law is thus qualified as the formal validity of international law follows
only from a formal act of implementation in the domestic legal order.
Although the attitude toward international legal norms is, in principle,
marked by openness (international law could guide the interpretation
process even when it is not ratified), the opening and closure of the
jurisdictional space is nonetheless strictly related to the formal
procedure (ratification process). The translatability of norms from the
international to the domestic sphere, in other words, is relocated to a
formal level.
The German interviewees did not make this kind of detailed
differentiation. Although differentiation is made between legal
comparison and reliance on international law, international and
European legal obligations are not questioned as to their formal status
but taken as a given determinant of the domestic legal process. The
generally unqualified insistence on the power of international norms in
the domestic sphere is also to be understood as a technique backing up
the underlying post-war German identity and transporting the belief in
97. Interview with Anonymous Interviewee Canadian B (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter CA
B].
98. CA A, supra note 51.
99. See generally Renee Provost, Judging in Splendid Isolation, 56 AM. J. CoMP. L. 125
(2008).
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a state that is open toward international law. 0 0 At the same time, the
interviews with German practitioners also reveal what may be called an
ideational suppression of international law, in particular when it comes
to the protection of fundamental rights.
In this respect, the comparison reveals an almost paradoxical
constellation. On the one hand, we find a normative order that is
formally closed toward international law (in a dualist sense) but, at the
same time, ideationally open for foreign or international sources as
interpretive guidance (Canada). On the other hand, we find a normative
order characterized by a formal openness toward international law but,
at the same time, an ideational closure regarding the usage of "outside"
sources (Germany). It follows that international law can actually be
conceived as binding in Germany in a way that is not possible in
Canada (or other "dualist" systems). Yet, this "theoretical" dispute
between dualism and monism remains rather academic and is somehow
misplaced, at least with regard to the German case. While the Federal
Constitutional Court has developed openness toward international law
as a constitutional principle,' 0 the court is, by the same token, explicitly
committed to "dualism."102 Against this background, the theoretical
distinction loses analytical clout. Subsequently, a distinction between
binding and persuasive authority of foreign or international legal
sources cannot be drawn exclusively from doctrinal reading of the
(transnational) legal process. What the analysis shows is that, while
reliance on international law and other exogenous legal sources does
play a role in the two legal systems, the mere notion of openness toward
international law is not an adequate category to evaluate the
orientation of legal practice. Despite the shared awareness of what
happens beyond the jurisdictional borders, notions of "communal"
structures in the global realm or the ways in which international law is
to be obeyed in the nation-state context differ remarkably. Although
"the international" is available within the national context, its meaning
is not shared as a structure of meaning-in-use.
100. See generally Philip Kunig, Volkerrecht und staatliches Recht [Public International
Law and State Law], in VOLKERRECHT 73 (Vitzthum WG ed., 2010) (for a doctrinal
discussion on that point).
101. "Constitutional Principle" is to be translated in German to "Prizip der
Vblkerrechtsfreundlichkeit."
102. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (Federal Constitutional Court) Oct. 14, 2004,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (BVERFGE) (Decisions of the
German Constitutional Court) 111, 307 (Ger.).
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B. Fundamental Rights and Torture
The question on the abstention from torture brought up before
constitutional courts did raise fundamental human rights issues and
often involved a consideration of the possibility that individuals would
face torture, in particular when being returned to their countries of
origin. 103 Accordingly, international norms like those prohibiting the use
of torture were used by practitioners arguing on behalf of these
individuals in the domestic context.104 This, in turn, gives us the
opportunity to account for convergent or divergent cross-border reliance
on those types of international legal norms. The indicators do, therefore,
point to a useful example for our analysis of cross-referencing and
community formation.
Thus, when asked for the priority of fundamental rights in the legal
process, German judges tended to answer in a textbook style:
The fundamental rights . . . will have to be put in
equilibrium with the rest of the legal order. And Article
1 (3) GG [German Basic Law] puts fundamental rights
in a very strong position but in the considerations of
proportionality . . . fundamental rights are to be
balanced with other legitimate objectives and ends of the
state. But almost the whole legal order can be derived
from fundamental rights so that there is hardly a
question that is not, in one way or another, influenced
by fundamental rights. Of course . .. fundamental rights
stand above any other law but they will also have to be
embedded within the general legal order.105
Along the same line, another German judge held that "our
fundamental rights can be restrained; and they can be restrained in the
interest of the common good. This, the Constitutional Court has said
again and again; not the sovereign individual but the individual within
103. See BverfG, Oct. 15, 2007, docket number 2 BvR 1680/07 (Ger.), available at JURIS;
BverfG, Oct. 24, 2003, docket number 2 BvR 1521/03 (Ger.), available at JURIS; see also
BverfG, Nov. 5, 2003, docket number 2 BvR 1506/03 (Ger.), available at JURIS; Suresh v.
Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Ahani v. Canada [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72 (Can.).
104. See generally United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 Dec. 1984, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 1465, p. 85.
105. Ger. B, supra note 54.
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the community." 106 Later in the interview, the same judge reformulated
this argument with respect to the challenge of terrorism.
Fundamental right[s] shall be maintained, even in times
of terrorism. Of course, they can be restrained. That is
written down in the Basic Law. For the protection of
common goods, also security . . . . Both are important
values, none of them shall be abandoned. We must
safeguard fundamental rights also in the fight against
terrorism but we must also fight terrorism. 107
While it is not surprising that lawyers are turning to normative
equilibria and questions of proportionality when fundamental rights
may be constrained, the tone changed as soon as the discussion came to
issues of torture. When asked about the role that abstention from
torture plays in the legal system, all German interviewees converged on
the distinctively common position that is exemplified in the comments
made by this interviewee: "This prohibition of torture is absolutely
effective; . . . any softening of this strict prohibition brings everything to
collapse."1 08 The same interviewee goes so far as to say that any attempt
to "influence the freedom of will or to push an accused person in a
certain direction has nothing to do with the objective principle of the
rule of law."109 Any notion of "collateral damage" would not be possible
in this regard. The state would, in so doing, "in part put into question its
substance." 10 In other words, any move toward the acceptance of
torture practice is understood as leading to the erosion of legality in a
foundational sense. Torture was thus revealed to be understood per se
as a contradiction of the identity of the German rule of law."'
While this notion of state identity represents the most explicit
rejection of torture practices revealed by the project's text corpus, it is
nonetheless representative of the German sample. Other interviewees,
though less explicitly, articulated similar positions. With regard to
fundamental rights of individuals, one judge opined that "we balance
like I have told you before but there are boundaries where we stop
balancing . . . And also, the prohibition of torture is where we stop
106. Ger. C, supra note 63.
107. Id.
108. Ger. A, supra note 50.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Note that although commonly translated as "Rule of Law," the German term
"Rechtsstaatlichkeit' points to the state (or to statehood).
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balancing."112 Thus, this boundary is torture, a line that is not to be
crossed. In a cynical way, the same judge continues: "[Clertain things
the state is not allowed to do even though they might be very practical.
Torture is practical but not allowed."113
Relating to a more global perspective, another constitutional judge
noted that torture would not belong to the terminology of the German
Basic Law but would emanate from international law. "But," he
continued,
we have the human dignity [as used in Article 1 (1) GG]
that might sometimes be exaggerated but for sure has
an important position related to torture . . . also the
Basic Law acts on the assumption of a notion of man,
but also notion of the state, that excludes torture per se.
That does come with a price as any legal warranty
comes at a price. But in particular the constitutional
order that declares human dignity as being untouchable
in Article 1, Para.1 is aware of that price and is willing
to pay for it.114
This interpretation of the torture norm was not only made by the
perhaps more idealistic constitutional court judges. Chief prosecutors
equally articulated quite distinct perceptions when pointing out that
"the prohibition of torture is absolute." An extradition to a country
where somebody would face torture "cannot happen" and would be
an absurdity when human dignity is really taken as the
superior principle; thus, I would reject that. . . . I mean,
let's say, the protection of human dignity prohibits
torture. . . . I would say the overall spirit of the Basic
Law itself makes that clear; with us, this does not
happen. And in addition, we are obliged in terms of
international law.115
It is important to note here that, although abstention from torture
exists as a rather concrete norm in international law, the German
interviewees developed their respective arguments against any practice
of torture by building entirely upon domestic constitutional discourse.
112. Ger. C, supra note 63.
113. Id.
114. Ger. B, supra note 54.
115. Ger. E, supra note 55.
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Particularly, the last passage quoted above is symptomatic for the
German normative structure of meaning-in-use. The normative
rejection of torture mainly emanates from the "overall spirit of the Basic
Law," whereas the obligations from international law are mentioned
only in addition.
We consider this an unexpected closure of the German normative
structure-in-use. The emerging picture looks even more interesting
when compared to the normative structure that can be said to be in use
by the Canadian interviewees. While Canadian practitioners seem to be
rather open minded with regard to relying on international norms as
sources of interpretation or an "interpretive guide," they nonetheless
embrace international law conditionally. Thus, their fidelity toward
international law remains qualified.
While the Canadian perception can, therefore, be interpreted as an
ideational openness toward international law, which is coupled with a
quite formalistic closure of the Canadian national jurisdiction, by
contrast, the German perception reveals the opposite: the openness
toward international law is very much accomplished by constitutional
formalism while, at the same time, a closure of the structure of
meaning-in-use operates in an ideational mode by taking the notion of
human dignity as considered in Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law as
the primary frame of reference.116
C. From Cross-Referencing to Cross-Fertilization?
The Canadian and German samples demonstrated that decisions by
foreign courts are understood as nonbinding, as Slaughter has argued.
But against the background of the mentioned instrumentalist or
strategic accounts on "the foreign" or "the international," the question
must be raised whether concepts established in the course of foreign
jurisprudence can really be understood as having what Slaughter has
called "persuasive authority."117 Here, the critical caveats on legal
comparison apply. 118 A difference between Canadian and German
positions can indeed be demonstrated based on the interviewees'
perception of the meaning of international legal norms. In comparison,
German interviewees were much less reluctant in holding that
international norms are binding on decisions of the domestic legal
116. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 1 (Ger.) ("Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.").
117. SLAUGHTER, supra note 24, at 75-77.
118. See Frankenberg, supra note 78; see also Peer Zumbansen, Comparative Law's
Coming of Age? Twenty Years after Critical Comparisons, 6 GER. L. J. 1073 (2005).
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system. Although one judge mentioned that international law would
formally not supersede domestic law, he argued that one would always
try not to interpret norms in such a way that a conflict or normative
collision between international and domestic law arises.119
To relate this insight to cross-referencing and transjudicial dialogue
with regard to the project's over-arching question about the emergence
of a shared normative structure of meaning-in-use as a necessary
condition for a global community of courts, the following five
observations can be made. First, cross-referencing has been confirmed
as a common practice among Canadian and German legal practitioners.
Our interviewees were not only aware of this practice but took an active
role in this process. Both groups of interviewees, however, revealed
specific limits of reception. Normative structures across nation-state
jurisdictions refer to a common space that is not necessarily identifiable
as global. While Canadian interviewees demonstrated awareness of the
Commonwealth community, German interviewees referred to a legal
order that was predominantly characterized by the European Union's
normative order. The types of transnational awareness that the case
study found were thus distinctive with regard to common legal
traditions and trajectories rather than with regard to a global
community. This points to the problem of a limited notion of globality.
Putative postcolonial limits of reception are beyond the scope of this
paper. Against the background of the research conducted here, however,
one can generally be skeptical toward transcultural reception of legal
practice, let alone an effective integration of normative spheres through
(or even despite) cross-referencing practice.
Second, cross-referencing did generate feedback as an indicator for
normative cross-fertilization of the involved interviewees' respective
root arenas. Despite the above finding of, if spatially limited, common
normative reference, the emphasis that was applied to the respective
domestic legal context suggests that claims about a normative
penetration of domestic legal contexts through cross-referencing and
transjudicial dialogue could not be confirmed.
Third, cross-referencing cannot always be considered as the most
effective practice. While it was acknowledged as a frequent practice by
the interviewees, it was often perceived as being ineffective. The
meaning of international norms and the effectiveness of foreign legal
practice reflected the particular normative context of the corresponding
legal order, and interviewees in both countries seemed to be perfectly
aware of the fact that these meanings changed when transferred to
119. Ger. C, supra note 63.
294
LOST WITHOUT TRANSLATION?
another arena. This aspect directly affects the translational character of
cross-referencing.
Fourth, cross-referencing was viewed as instrumental toward
specific interests. Subsequently, it is to be understood as productive
with regard to a particular legal community. This may be due to the fact
that references to formally validated foreign or international law, more
often than not, are made for strategic reasons. Thus, the motivation for
cross-referencing was the intention of making a particular legal
argument rather than the constitution of a common legal order. With
regard to the putative emergence of a community, we can thus say that
translation failed. In turn, the counterfactual question could be raised
regarding the integrative consequences of successful translation: Would
a community of courts render translation meaningless? It is particularly
this aspect that points further research toward the nexus between legal
community and translation.
Fifth, the two country samples revealed a distinct nexus between
functional and normative community foundation. While the German
interviewees by and large situated themselves within a normative
structure, which they consider as open to the norms of international
law, they demonstrated reluctance regarding an explicit reliance on the
very norms of international law. By contrast, Canadian interviewees
revealed a more frequent reference to international legal norms while at
the same time pointing to the formal requirements of international legal
treaties to be enacted through domestic legislation. In sum, this finding
supports the project's argument that, to draw conclusions about the
implications of cross-referencing for community formation, it is vital to
identify whether or not shared normative structures of meaning-in-use
emerge through that very dialogue.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
While cross-referencing between courts and judges is but one
necessary aspect of an emergent global community of courts, a global
community of courts depends on "good" translation resulting in the
emergence of shared principles, values, and norms as the normative
roots of community. This article argued that the practice of cross-
referencing international norms or foreign court decisions is to be
conceptualized as distinct from cross-fertilization. We have therefore
suggested understanding cross-referencing mainly as an empirically
observable process (i.e., as the referencing of positive legal norms or
judicial decisions across jurisdictional boundaries). In turn, we
understood cross-fertilization as the effective merging of normative
meanings among two or more legal orders. To capture that additional
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normative dimension, the project focused on the very notions of
normativity revealed by the interviewees.
On the basis of our limited analyses of interviews conducted with
legal practitioners in two countries, Canada and Germany, we hold-
against Slaughter-that a global "community" of courts has not yet
emerged. Although the concept of community does matter as an
explanatory reference for research on legal cross-referencing across
national borders, empirical findings suggest that regional communities,
such as the Commonwealth and the European Union, provide a decisive
common ground and thence the more important normative guidance for
court judges. While international relations theorists and international
lawyers have stressed the need for accountability and a new collective
global responsibility (e.g., when studying global governance institutions,
global networking, and global constitutionalism), our research suggests
that practice of cross-referencing is still more "culturally" fragmented
than unified, and normative references are more regionally diverse than
globally shared. Moreover, the normative context within which
referencing takes place-that is, where international norms or foreign
legal decisions are translated to-remains strong, so that the meaning
of "foreign" concepts is often constructed by means of contestation
rather than transferred from one contest into another.
As we have argued above, "good" translation of legal concepts from
one legal order to another entails a notion of context because legal
norms or decisions receive their particular meaning from how there are
embedded in a legal discourse. In this sense, translation is a paradoxical
practice since it implicates the embedding of a concept within a "new"
context, while, at the same time, it necessitates a certain consideration
of its "old" context. As our explorative case study suggests, the pluralism
thesis is more likely to win the day in the long run, as it is better
equipped to capture the distinctive normative effects of cross-
referencing and, hence, understand why cross-fertilization among
distinct normative orders remains still partial. For the time being,
global legal practice is thus "lost without translation."
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